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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONNA McBROOM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HOWARD KIRTLEY 
McBROOM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9'702 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce, award of custody 
of the minor children of the parties, property, ali-
mony and support money. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a decree 
awarding defendant the divorce on his counter-
claim and plaintiff $1.00 per year alimony, an·d 
awarding plaintiff custody of the two minor child-
ren, the property of the parties, $200.00 per month 
support money, ~and $750.00 attorneys fees, defend-
ant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal as a matter of law 
of that part of the decree awarding plaintiff cus-
tody of the two minor children, the property of the 
parties, $200.00 per month support money, $750.00 
attorneys fees and $1.00 per year alimony. 
STATEMENT OF FAC·T'S 
A preliminary statement is necessary to under-
stand the circumstances giving rise to this divorce 
action. 
'Plaintiff fraudulently commenced this action 
on August 25, 1961, by swearing to 'and filing a 
verified complaint, Which plaintiff admitted at trial 
was false, and having a restraining order issued, 
and defendant moved out of his home. (R. 1-9, 286-
289, 395, 461.) 
Pl'aintiff, prior to commencement of the action, 
had been guilty of a great many indiscretions and, 
in particular, had persistently disappeared from the 
home of th·e parties and stayed out all night. (R. 
1'99-310, 444-457.) Defendant, nevertheless, in order 
to protect his home and family, sought a reconcili-
ation, and without the aid of counsel personally 
entered into a stipulation with plaintiff's attorney, 
Leland S. Mc-Cullough, under which the hearing on 
the restraining order was continued witho~t date 
and defendant moved back into the home. (R. 10, 
456-4'57.) 
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The reconciliation was not successful. (R 292-
320, 457-469.) On January 15, 1962, defendant dis-
covered in a desk in his eight year old son's bedroom 
a diary, in the form of a little black book (Ex. 2), 
written in plaintiff's shorthand and certain mis-
cellaneous shorthand notes (Exs. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
18, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26) written by plaintiff. De-
fendant submitted the diary and shorthand notes 
to his attorneys and caused the same to be trans-
lated by a shorthand expert, Mr. Clair Johnson. 
(R. 320-322, 339-340, 436-438.) Defendant there-
upon discovered for the first time that from May 
19, 1961, down through and after commencement 
of this action on August 25, 1961, plaintiff, un-
beknown to defendant, been carrying on an immoral 
and adulterous relationship with a married ma.n, 
who resides in Salt Lake County with his wife and 
three ~hildren. (R. 199-310,237-239, 270.) The man's 
name was Bertram Jarvis. (R. 211.) He was em-
ployed as a truck driver for the telephone company. 
(R. 276.) Defendant further discovered for the 
first time that at the height of her affair with Jarvis 
plaintiff had deliberately set out in her own hand-
writing a design, scheme and plan to con1n1ence this 
divorce action and take from defendant his home, 
his children and his livelihood (Exs. 6, 18, R. 214-
219, 269, 286-287.) and that plaintiff at the time had 
admitted in her own handwriting that her motive 
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in so doing was not because of misconduct on the 
part of defendant but because of her relationships 
wi1th J·arvis. (Ex. 23, R. 268, 286-288, 315-318, 341-
342.) 
Defendant thereupon engaged Gordon I. Hyde 
of the law firm of McBroom & Hyde to represent 
him in the trial of this action and, for the purpose 
of obtaining an immediate and speedy trial, entered 
into a stipulation dated January 31, 1962 (R. 11-12, 
198, 477), which stipulation provided the follow-
ing: that pending the trial defendant would move 
out of the home; that defendant should have the 
right to visit the minor children in the home and 
out of the home at all reasonable times; that the 
fact that defendant so moved out of the home and 
entered into the stipulation should be without pre-
judice to the rights of defendant, and in particular, 
should not be construed by the parties or the court 
as an admission by defendant that plaintiff was a 
fit and proper person to have the care and custody 
of the minor children for any period of time and 
should not be construed as ,an admission by de-
fendant that plaintiff had any right or justifica-
tion for having defendant move out of the home; 
that plaintiff would forthwith file an amended com-
plaint; and that, upon defendant's filing a respon-
sive pleading, the case would be immediately set 
down for trial without a pretrial hearing. 
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The following statement of facts is, except 
where otherwise indicated, predicated on plaintiff's 
admissions and plaintiff's shorthand notes contained 
in her diary (Ex. 2) and translations thereof by 
plaintiff on the witness stand and the miscellaneous 
shorthand notes written by plaintiff with transla-
tions attached as testified to and corrected by plain-
tiff on the witness stand (Exs. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27, R. 199-310.) 
The parties were married ten years before trial 
on April 13, 1952. (R. 15, 13, 413.) Prior to the 
marriage defendant had no indication that plaintiff 
was an immo~al or obscene person. (R. 414.) 
There were two children born to the marriage, 
Howard Kirtley McBroom, Jr., age 8, referred to 
in the record as "Kirt" and Elizabeth McBroom, 
age 6, referred to in the record as "Lisa". (R. 15, 
t2, 175.) 
Throughout the marriage Mr. McBroom had 
been employed as a salesman and during the four 
years prior to trial was an agent for Equitable Life 
Assurance Society at Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 411.) 
The parties got along fairly well during the 
first four years of the marriage until after the birth. 
of the child, Lisa, in 1955. Defendant testified, that 
commencing in the year, 1956, and continuing there-
after throughout the marriage, plaintiff periodic-
ally disappeared from the home of the parties and 
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returned·late at night under the influence of. alcohol 
and. without satisfactory explanation :and that dur-
ing this period plaintiff refused to participate in 
activities of the family with the minor children. 
(R. 432-433.) Plaintiff on rebuttal generally de-
ned this and, in particular, testified that she did 
not .disappear from the home and refuse to engage 
in activities with the family in May and June of 
1961. (R. 533-534, 546.) In this plaintiff perjured 
herself. Plaintiff had previously admitted on cross-
examination that she had repeatedly and persistent-
ly disappeared from the home to consort with Jarvis 
during June of 1961, and continuing thereafter 
until the commencement of this action and that dur-
ing this period she had persistently failed to engage 
in activities with the family. (R. 199-310). 
On May 19, 1961, plaintiff, unbeknown to de-
fendant, met Bert Jarvis in the 9th South Grand 
Central Market. (R. 213, 226.) She noted the fact 
in her diary and that Jarvis told her he would call 
her later. ( R. 226.) She also wrote a shortliand 
note, dated May 19, 1961, (Ex. 9, R. 227-229) in 
which she again noted that Jarvis said he would 
call her and that she hoped he would. 
Thereafter on June 1, 1961, Jarvis telephoned 
plaintiff and made an appointment to n1eet her on 
the following day at a barroom, referred to in the 
diary as the O'ld Zang, now known as the Blue 
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Angel. (R. 234.) Plaintiff met Jarvis at the Blue 
Angel on the following day, June 2. (R. 234.) Plain-
tiff and defendant had previously arranged to take 
their two children to Lagoon on the next day, Sat-
urday, June 3, ( R. 34, 235, 446.) Instead plaintiff, 
\Vhile she was consorting with Jarvis in ·the Blue 
Angel, made an engagement to meet him on Satur-
day in a park. ( R. 234.) On Saturday, June 3, plain-
tiff went and stayed with Jarvis ( R. 235) and 
plaintiff's husband took the children to Lagoon 
alone. ( R. 235, 446.) 
From this time on through the months of June, 
July and August and after the commencement of 
this divorce action on August 25, 1961, into Sep-
tember of 1961, plaintiff was in daily contact with 
Jarvis either in person or by telephone and repeat-
edly and persistently left her home, her minor 
children and the defendant to consort with Jarvis. 
(R. 199-338.) 
During this period plaintiff repeatedly and per-
sistently frequented barrooms with Jarvis in Salt 
Lake City and, in particular, establishments known 
as the Pecan, located under a hotel on West Temple 
and Third South Streets, the 451 Club, located on 
South West Temple, the Indigo and the Blue Angel. 
Plaintiff consorted with Jarvis in these establish-
ments in the day time and at night until such hours 
as 1:00 A.M. (R. 204-205, 221, 234, 240, 247, 199-
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310.) On substantially every occasion that plaintiff 
and Jarvis were together they drank alcoholic bev-
er.ages. Plaintiff noted in her shorthand note follow-
ing a meeting with Jarvis on September 10, 19'61, 
that it was the first time they had been together 
without drinking and that she found it, "very dull." 
(Ex. 24, R. 304, 199-310.) 
Plaintiff repeatedly and persistently stayed out 
all night with Jarvis until such hours as 2 :00 A.M., 
2:30 A.M., 3:00 A.M., 3:30 A.M., 5:00 A.M., and 
8:00 A.M. (R. 204, 274, 281-283, 2·9'2.) On such 
occasions plaintiff admitted that she stayed with 
J'arvis in barrooms, supra, p. 7, in 'his home in 
Kearns while his family was away, in an apartment 
on the west side, and in canyons in parked auto-
mo'biles. (R. 205, 241, 248, 294, 284, 301-303.) 
Pl!aintiff denied that she and Jarvis were com-
mitting adultery. (R. 201, 353.) The evidence to 
the contrary is conclusive. 
(1) On July 14, 1961, plain'tiff picked Jarvis 
up sometime after 4 :30 P.M., they drank in bar-
rooms, then stayed out all 11ight, and she didn't get 
home until 8:00 o'clock the next morning. Plain-
tiff noted in her diary on July 19, 1961, that she 
met Jarvis at 8 :20 P.M., they went to a barroom 
and on this occasion she was, "a good girl". (R. 
209.) Plaintiff noted in her diary on August 3, 1961, 
that she met Jarvis at 7 :00 P.M., they went to a 
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barroom, that she didn't get home until 3:00 A.M., 
and that she, "was bad again." ( R. 27 4.) 
(2) Defendant testified that he did not have 
marital relations with plaintiff from sometime prior 
to the first time plaintiff stayed out all night on 
July 14, 1961, until the time of the attempted recon-
ciliation following the commencement of the divorce 
action. ( R. 453, 459.) Defendant further testified 
that in July of 1961, pl·aintiff commenced sleeping 
alone. ( R. 453, 4'59, 461.) In August of 1961 de-
fendant discovered that his wife was using chemical 
contraceptives. ( R. 453-454.) Plaintiff admitted 
that she commenced using contraceptives in August 
of 1961, and explained on the witness sta,nd that 
she dild so because she was having marital relations 
with her husband. ( R. 550.) On July 22 and July 
23, 1961, plaintiff wrote shorthand notes (Exs. 6 
& 7) in which she set forth the following with refer-
ence to her relationships with her husband: "'He is 
no longer your husband. You are no longer his wife. 
* * * Move out of the bedroom. Move Kirt into 
the bedroom with him as soon as possible. * * * 
From now on I will consider myself divorced. I 
will not live with you as a wife. * * * I will live my 
own life, coming and going as I decide and in effect 
acting as though I am a divorcee. * * * Sleep in 
your own bed." (R. 214-216.) These notes were 
written within one week after an occasion when 
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plaintiff stayed out all night with Jarvis, supTa. 
p. 8-9. It is apparent that defendant was not h·av-
ing s~xual relations with his wife and that plain-
tiff's testimony was perjured. 
(3) Plaintiff kept a menstrual chart in 1961 
(Ex. 21) on which she kept a detailed record of 
her periods of menstruation during the year, 1961. 
She noted on the menstrual chart the following, 
"S·tarted 5/19/61. 45 minutes. 9th South Grand 
Central. Ended 9-10-61. What a year!!" (Ex. 21, 
R. 306-309.) May 19, 1961, was the first occasion 
on which plaintiff met Jarvis. (R. 213, 226, 306-
309.) September 10, 1961, was the last date on 
which plaintiff admitted consorting with Jarvis. 
( R. 303-304.) If plaintiff was not comrnitting adul-
tery with Jarvis, there was no occasion for her to 
make these notations on her menstrual chart. 
Plaintiff admitted that she repeatedly and per-
sistently lied to defendant as to her whereabouts 
:and activities and by the use of artifice and intrigue 
with Jarvis kept her relationship from the knowl-
edge of defendant. ( R. 248, 271, 283, 299.) 
Plaintiff testified that, during her nightly es-
capades with Jarvis, she either left the children with 
baby tenders or with her husband and that, in any 
event, she was not worried about them because her 
husba.nd was a good father and took care of them. 
( R. 205, 234-235, 250, 273.) Defendant testified 
10 
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that he repeatedly came home at night after work 
and found the children left with young baby tenders 
and that his wife had left no information with the 
baby tenders as to her whereabouts or provision 
for care of the children in case of difficulty or em-
ergency. (R. 449, 454, 457, 462.) Plaintiff admitted 
in a shorthand note written July 22, 1961, at the 
height of her escapades with Jarvis, that she was 
giving the impression that she wanted her children 
to sleep eighteen hours a day and th~at she was so 
busy with all of her "responsibilities" that she did 
not have time to answer her children's questions. 
(Ex. 6, R. 217, 218.) 
During the period plaintiff repeatedly and per-
sistently refused and neglected to engage in acti-
vities with her children so that she could consort 
with Jarvis. Typical examples are the following. 
On Saturday, June 3, 1961, plaintiff, pursuant to 
a prior appointment, consorted with Jarvis instead 
of going to Lagoon with her husband and children 
as the family had previously planne'd. ( R. 2'34-235, 
446.) On Friday, July 14, 1'9'61, defendant's em-
ployer, Equitalble Life Assurance Society, was giv-
ing an outing for its employees and their wives and 
children at Lagoon. On Thursday, July 13, 1961, 
plaintiff invited Jarvis to meet her on the 14th be-
cause her husband and children would be at Lagoon. 
Thereafter on July 14th defendant took the children 
11 
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to the outing alone and plaintiff met Jarvis at ap-
proximately 4:30 P.M., drank with him in barrooms 
and staye'd out with him all night. (R. 203-204, 
449.) On ·sunday, September 10, 1961, plaintiff went 
!and conso~ted with Jarvis in an apartment in which 
he was staying on the west side in Salt Lake City. 
(R. 303.) On cross examination plaintiff was asked 
where the children were in the meantime. She re-
plied that they were in church with her husband, 
Howard. (R. 303.) Jarvis was a ma~rried man with 
a wife and three children. (R. 237, 2'38.) Plaintiff 
met Jarvis on Jarvis' birthday, August 11, 1961, at 
6:30 P.M., drank with him in barrooms ~and stayed 
out with him all night until 5:00 A.M. (R. '281-
28'2.) 
Defendant testified tlnt, when plaintiff arrived 
home at early hours in the morning, she was repeat-
edly under the influence of alcohol and neglected 
the children and that on such occasions defendant 
did care for the children. (R. 43'2, 44'9, 4152, 457, 
461-462.) It is apparent that plaintiff, ~after her 
admitted nightly escapades in ·barrooms and staying 
out all night, could not possibly have been in a con-
dition, physically or otherwise, to provfde proper 
care for her children. 
Plaintiff surreptiously used family funds of 
the parties for the purpose of purchasing gifts for 
Jarvis and for the purpose of dissipation with Jarvis. 
12 
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Defendant maintained a joint checking account with 
Walker Bank and Trust Company upon which plain-
tiff was permitted to draw. (Exs. 14 & 19, R. 264, 
265.) On August 9, 1961, plaintiff drew check No. 
3760 in 'the amount of $20.00 on the account, pay-
able to Par Men's 'Shop, for the purchase of a sport 
shirt for Jarvis at 'a price of $12.80. (Ex. 19, R. 
277~281.) In the check register (Ex. 14) plaintiff 
entered opposite check No. 3760, "'Pars, dentist, tie, 
lunch, etc., $'20.00." On August 4, 1961, plaintiff 
noted in her diary that Jarvis telephoned her and 
wanted to know how much money she hald given 
him the night before on August 3rd which was an 
occasion when she met Jarvis at 7:00 P.M., went 
with him to a barroom, stayed with him until 3:00 
A.M., "and was bad again." (R. 274-275.) Defen-
dant testified that throughout the summer of 1961, 
he purchased the groceries for the family. (R. 4'27.) 
Defendant produced checks cashed by plaintiff 
totalling $498;26 at Grand Central M'aTket during 
the period from May 22, 1961, to August 24, 1961, 
while she was consorting with Jarvis. (Ex. 43, R. 
427.) 
At the height of her affair with Jarvis plain-
tiff deliberately set forth in her own handwriting a 
fraudulent design and scheme to commence this di-
vorce action against defendant and to take from 
defendant his children, his home, his property and 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his money. (Exs. 6 & 7, 214-219.) Plaintiff ad-
mitted in her own handwriting that she commenced 
this divorce action because of her relationships with 
Jarvis and not because of misconduct on the part 
of the defendant. (Ex. 23, R. 286-·288, 316.) 
On July 14, 1961, plaintiff stayed out all night 
with Jar-Vis. (R. 204.) On July 18 plaintiff made an 
engagement with Jarvis for the following night. 
(R. 208.) On July 19 plaintiff spent the night with 
Jarvis in a barroom. (R. 209.) She thereupon on 
July 2·2, 1961, write shorthand notes, Exhibits 6 and 
7, in which she laid ·the ground work for this di-
vorce action :and, in particular, made plans to work 
toward her goal, to keep records of her husband's 
business, to see that she got 'her share of the money, 
to rifle his desk, and to hire her own attorney and 
take legal action against him. (Exs. 6 & 7, R. 214-
2t9.) 
:Three days la,ter on July 25, 1961, plaintiff 
made the following false entries in the check register 
of the joint accoun1t of the parties With Walker 
Bank and Trust Company: c:heck No. 3716, "cash, 
$1'5.00"; Check No. 37 4'2, "difference in mistake of 
deposit, $75.00"; Check No. 3718, "school clothes 
and win,ter pajamas, $150.00"; Check No. 3741 
"p~aint, $20.00"; and, on July 31, 1961, Check No. 
37 49 with no designation, in the amount of $20.00. 
(Ex. 14. R. 264-268.) Plaintiff in fact dated each of 
14 
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these checks July 31, 1961, and made each of them 
payable to Murray First Thrift and Loan Company. 
(Ex. 15, R. 264-268.) On July 31, 1961, pJa,intiff 
opened a joint savings account in hers and her hus-
band's name with ·Murray First Thrift and Loan 
Company, of which defendant testified he had knowl-
edge. (Ex. 42, R. 264-'268, 427.) On the same day, 
July 31, 1961, plaintiff opened a separate savings 
account in her name alone in the Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company, of which defenldant had 
no knowledge. (R. 264-268.) She deposited the 
checks No. 3716, 3'718, 3741, 3742, and 3749, as 
to which she had made the false entries in the check 
1·egister, in the account in her name ·alone. ( Exs. 15 
& 16, R. 264-26'9.) Plaintiff asserted at trial that 
defendant had knowledge of both the joint account 
and private account (R. 264) and then explained 
that she opended the private ·a~ecount because, ,at the 
time 1che-n she commenced the divorce action, the 
d-efendant had closed the joint checking account. 
(R. 264, 39'6.) The private account was opened on 
July 31, 1961. Plaintiff did not commence the di-
vorce action and defendant did not close the joint 
checking account until one month later. (R. 1-9, 
2'86-289.) It is 'apparent that plaintiff's testimony 
was false and that this whole transaction was a part 
of the deliberate plan set out in plaintiff's short-
hand notes dated July 22, 1'961, to divorce defendant 
·and take his money. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
For the next month, from July 25, 1961, to 
August 18, 119161, plaintiff was in daily contact with 
Jarvis, and spent her nights with him in barrooms, 
and on several occasions stayed out all night with 
him. (R. '269..;2'86.) After Friday, August 18, Jarvis 
stopped contacting pliaintiff. (R. 286, 287.) She, 
therefore, on August '23 made an appointment with 
McCullough to commence this divorce action and 
have her husband removed from the home because 
of Jarvis. (R. 287.) She noted in her diary that on 
Friday, August 18, Jarvis told her he woutd call 
her 'the next week. She thereafter made the follow-
ing entries in the diary concerning Jarvis. Monday, 
August 21, "Not a word did I hear." (R. 286.) 
Tuesday, August 22, "Not a word again. I don't 
understand." ('R. 286.) Wednesday, August 23, "It 
is now 12:30. No phone call today. The message 
seems to be coming through loud and clear. I made 
an appointment to see Mr. McCullough." (R. 287.) 
Plaintiff signed the complaint ~before McCul-
lough on August 24, 1961. The complaint set forth 
under ·oath that defendant, "on many occasions phy-
sically beat and abused plaintiff." The verifications 
set forth that plaintiff had read the complaint, knew 
its contents and that the same were true of her own 
knowledge. rt was signed by plaintiff and subscribed 
an·d s:worn to by her before Leland S. McCullough, 
her attorney. (R. 1-4.) (R. 7-8.) Plaintiff testified 
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at trial that she did not know that defendant had 
ever be a ten her. ( R. 288. ) She further testified, by 
way of explanation, that she signed the complaint 
without reading it. (R. 395.) The verification, sworn 
to before her attorney, expressly set forth that she 
had. (R. 4.) On August 2·5, 1961, defendant was 
removed from his home and children under the re-
straining order. ( R. '288-'29~2.) 
On August 26, 1961, the day after the restrain-
ing order was issued, defendant, in an effort to 
save his home and children, attempted to effect a 
reconciliation and, without the ·benefit of counsel, 
entered into a stipulation with plaintiff's attorney 
providing that the ·hearing on the restralining order 
be continued without daJte. (R. 10, 457.) Defendant 
also on August 26 arranged with plaintiff to move 
back into the home, but plaintiff insisted that de-
fendant remain away from the home until Sunday, 
August 27. ·(R. 292-2'94, 457.) She explained that 
she did this because she wanted to give her husband 
some time to "think" and because she wanted to 
find out ·about her "family problems". ( R. 294.) She 
had in fact on Friday, August 25, the day she had 
her husband removed from the home, made an en-
gagement with Jiarvis to meet him at 3:00 P.M. on 
Saturday, August 26. (R. 291~294.) She met Jarvis 
at 3:30 P.M. on Saturday, August 26, and stayed 
out with him until 2 :00 A.M. on Sunday, August 
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27. (R. 291-294.) Defendant testified that he in 
fact returned home on Saturday night ia:t approxi-
mately midnight because the children had been left 
alone with a young baby sitter, and lhe was worried 
about them. (R. 457.) Defendant was at the home 
when plaintiff returne'd from her es~apade with 
Jarvis at 2:00 A.M. on Sunday morning. (R. 457.) 
Defendant further testified that plaintiff told him 
that he had a filthy mind if he thought she had 
been out on a date and that she thereafter 1a~wakened 
the child, Lisa, and said, "Look at your father, isn't 
he nice, now he is crying." (R. 457.) 
On Sunday, August '27, defendant took plain-
tiff and the two children on a trip to Jackson L1ake 
and an outing sponsoreld by Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society, from whiCh they returned on August 
31. They did not get along well on the trip. (R. 294-
2'96, 457-460.) Defendant testified that on the way 
home plaintiff to'ld him she was going to have a 
baby and that, if she did, he was responsible but 
he would never see it. ( R. 296, 459.) Defendant 
was amazed because he had not had marital rela-
tions with plaintiff since prior to July 13, 1961. 
(R. 459.) 
Thereafter on September 5, 1961, plaintiff took 
up with Jarvis again. S;he met him at 6:15 P.M., 
spent the evening with him in a barroom, and stayed 
out with hlim until2 :00 A.M. When she arrived home 
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she was sick and remained in bed all of the follow-
ing day. She noted in her diary, "Poor Howard. 
He was worried about me !and I was sick." (R. 297.) 
The next day, September 7, she noted in her 
diary that Jarvis called again, he had a hangover 
'and that she offered to bring him a record an·d some 
spaghetti to comfort him. ( R. 300, 301.) 
On Saturday, September 9, plaintiff went to 
a barroom and met Jarvis there. ( R. 302.) On Sun-
day, September 10, plaintiff went and consorted 
with Jarvis in his apartment during the daytime. 
(R. 301-303.) On cross ex1amination she was asked 
where her children were in the meantime. She ex-
plained that they were in church with her husband. 
('R. 303.) 
On Monday, September 11, 1961, Jarvis did 
not call plaintiff. ( R. 309.) Defendant testified that 
at this point plaintiff again insisteld thiat he move 
out of his home by Tuesday, Septe1nber 12, and told 
him that, if he d'id not, s'he would get another re-
straining order and have him m'oved out. (R. 447.) 
Defendant moved out of his home again on Sep-
tember 12. (R. 447.) Plaintiff wrote in her letter 
to Jarvis, shorthand note, Exhibit 2·3, the following 
concerning the event: ''Your last words to me were: 
'I will call tomorrow' (M'Onday). You didn't call 
Monday. I had a quarrel with Howard on Tues'day 
and insisted he move out. I am tiTed of going to 
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the attorney again if he didn't. He did move. You 
didn't phone on Tuesday. You .didn't phone on W.e!t-
nes.day. I w.as sick Wednesday night * * *." ( R. 
316.) The record is ·clear that on this occasion plain-
tiff again caused her husband to be moved out of 
his home and separated from his chi1dren because 
of her relationship with Jarvis under circumstances 
identical to those under which she commenced this 
divorce action on August 25, 1961, and had him 
thrown out of his home by use of a rest~aining order. 
(R. 286~288.) She also noted in her diary that Jarvis 
did not call from Tuesday, September 12, through 
Thursday, September 1'4, and on September 14 she 
wrote in her diary, "It is now 1:00 and so far no 
phone calls * * * The writing on the wall is pretty 
clear. Guess this is it * * * ." (R. 309-311.) There-
after she noted in her diary that s'he was sick in 
bed all day from Friday, September 15 to Monday, 
September 18, (R. 311) and she wrote in her letter 
to Jarvis, (Ex. 23), concerning the event fuiat, "the 
doctor couldn't figure out what was wrong- but 
I knew and couldn't tell him." (R. 317.) 
On Sunday, September 24, plaintiff noted in 
her diary that, "Howard came home. Tha11k good-
ness." (R. 311.) This demonstrates clearly that, 
having been jilted lby Jarvis, plaintiff 'had no fur-
ther reason to have her husband out of his home. 
On Wednesday, September ·27, she noted in the diary 
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that her husband gave her $300.00 for new carpet-
ing. ( R. 312.) This was the last entry in the diary. 
Mter Jarvis jilted her, plaintiff wrote the letter 
to Jarvis, (Ex. 23), in wnieh she blamed Jarvis for 
all of her difficulties 1and said of her husband that 
he 'had put forth extra effort to get along and was 
truly in love With her, ''true h'is every glance, his 
every dee·d." ( R. 315~318, 341.) 
In the meantime, what was the defendant do-
ing during the year, 1961, in addition to protecting 
and caring for 'h1is chil'dren and endeavoring to save 
his ·home and family? Defendan~t had been employed 
~ls an agent for Equitable Life Assurance Society 
only three years before. (R. 411.) The Salt Lake 
agency of Equitable Life Assurance Society covers 
the entire state of Utah and part of Nevada. (R. 
412.) From June 5 to August 21, 1961, while plain-
tiff was engaged in destroying the family, defendant 
lead the entire agency in new policies sold and placed 
second in total production. (Ex. 39, R. 412.) In 
the fall sales campaign ending December 19, 1961, 
defendant lead the en~tire agen'cy in both new poli-
cies sold ~and total volume. (Ex. 40, R. 413.) For 
the entire year, 1961, defendant placed third in the 
entire agency in total production. (Ex. 41, R. 413.) 
Defendan't's net in'come, as shown by the record 
and found by the court, was only $546.00 per month 
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because there h~ad not been time for his renewal 
premiums to build up. (R. 181, 486-487.) 
In an effort to establish condonation against 
defendant plaintiff testified on the witness stand 
that, 1after defendant returned to the home in 'Sep-
tember, 19'61, she disclosed the affair with Jarvis 
to him. (R. 211.) This was bald perjury. Her testi-
mony on cross examination, with reference to the 
so-called disclosure, was evasive and amounted to 
nothing more than a general statement to the effect 
that she an'd 'her husband had a discussion in which 
they stated that they would let by-gones by by-gones. 
(R. 211, 212.) On January 15, 1962, defendant dis-
:covered the diary (R. 320, 494.) Defendant record-
ed a ·convers~ation between himself and plaintiff on 
January 1'8, 1962. (Ex. 25, R. 320-322.) In the con-
versation defendant asked plaintiff if 'she was going 
to deny the contents of the diary th'at he 'h'ad discover-
ed. PTaintiff replied, "You're God-damned right I 
am." She 'then in the conversation proceeded to deny 
the 'con'ten'ts of the diary, the specific events set forth 
therein, and stated that it was an a fiction. (Ex. 
215.) Plaintiff knew that defendant was recording 
the conversation. She said at one stage to defendant, 
'''If you want to try it on another tape I will say 
it on another tape for you." (Ex. 25.) Plaintiff ad-
mitted at tri'al that the transcript of the tape was 
true. (R. 320-322 .. ) In any event there was no con-
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donation because of the events that occured between 
September of 1961 and January of 1962, when de-
fendant discovered the di1ary. 
Defendant testified that throughout the mar-
riage and particularly in November and December 
of 1961, an'd J'anuary of 196·2, plaintiff persistently 
used foul and o·bscene l~anguage 'and referre'd to 
defendant as a ~'son-of-a-·bitch" and "bastard" and 
by other more obscene epithets in the presence of 
the children. ( R. 415, 464, 466-469.) Plaintiff ad-
mitted that she customarily referred to defendant 
as a "son-of-a-bitch" an,d "bastard". (R. 3'29-330.) 
At this point plaintiff denied generally that 
she carried on other lewd 'a.nd obscene conversations 
in the presence of the children and visited obscenity 
upon the children. ( R. 2'54.) She was then asked 
on cross examination specifically whether or not 
in a conversation with :defendant and the child, 
Kirt, age 8, and the child, Lisa, age 6, she had not 
S'aid, "Play with your te·ats, Howard. Are they grow-
ing. Look, Lisa, he is rubbing 'his teats." (R. 254-
261.) She twice under oath categorically denied that 
any such 'conversation ever occurred. ( R. 254.) She 
again committed perjury. She was then confronted 
with a tape recording of a convers~ation between 
herself, her two children an'd her husband on Jan-
uary 21, 1962, six weeks before trial, and asked 
whether or not she wished to have the recording 
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played for the court. She replied that she did not 
and stipulated that Exhibit 17 could be received 
in evidence as a true and correct transcript of the 
recording of the conversation on January 21, 1962. 
( R. 25'5-2'61.) In the conversation plaintiff said in 
the presence of her children, "Play with your teats, 
Howard. Are they growing?" Defendant pleaded 
with her to stop. She refused and thereafter called 
to the child, Lisa, and said, ''Look, Lisa, he is rub-
bing his teats.'' (Ex. 17.) It is apparent that plain-
tiff is the type of woman that can come into court 
with a straight face an~d deny her insidious conduct 
with reference to the chil,dren; but, when confronted 
with specific proof, she is forced to admit the de-
pravity visited upon them. 
On cross examination plaintiff was confronted 
with Exhibits 28 through 37. (R. 332-337.) 'The 
documents are as 'Obscene as it would be possible 
for the human mind to conceive. Exhibit 28 deals 
with a small girl of tender years becoming involved 
in a sexual rel'a:tionship and thereafter conducting 
herself as a prostitute. Exhibit 29 deals with a small 
boy of the 1age of ten years, at the suggestion of his 
mother, bei'ng exposed to a degraded sexual rela-
tionship between his young sister and a third party 
in the home of the family. Exhibi't 30 deals in an 
obscene manner wi'th the physical and emotional as-
pects of sexu'al intercourse. Exhibit 31 is an obscene 
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parody on services in church, involving as prin-
cipals a minister of the gospel, the women members 
and children. Plaintiff testified that she acquired 
this material prior to the marriage of the parties 
and that she kept it in a drawer in the downstairs 
of the home together with some other things belong-
ing to her children. ( R. 332.) She claimed she had 
not read the material for so long that she did not 
1·emem:ber its contents and, therefore, could not iden-
tify it as the material she had gathered together 
and kept. (R. 332, 337.) She then testified that by 
reading the first three lines of Exhibit 28 she had 
a good idea as to the blalan·ce of the contents (R. 
332.) and by reading the first two lines of Exhibit 
29 she had a good idea of the balance of its contents. 
( R. 333.) The first three lines of Exhibit 28 and 
the first two lines of Exhibit 29 ~are completely in-
nocuous. If plaintiff coul~d tell the balance of the 
contents from reading those lines, either one of two 
things is certain. She remembered the contents of 
the documents or she has a completely depraved im-
agination. The alternative is immaterial so far as 
it pertains to her fitness as a custodian of minor 
children. Defendant testified that he first saw these 
documents when he discovered plaintiff reading them 
in May of 1961, that he told plaintiff to get rid of 
them because exposure would be extremely damag-
ing to the children and that plaintiff said she would 
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get rid of them. (R. 416-419.) Defendant found the 
documents ·and took them with him when he was 
removing his financial records from the home after 
the discovery of plaintiff's diary on January 15, 
19612. (R. 418.) The admitted facts are that plain-
tiff, unbeknown to her husband, brought this materi-
al into the marri~age, th·at she carried it from home 
to home of the parties, and tha:t she was keeping 
it in ~a drawer in an open room together with other 
things belonging to her children. 
Plaintiff got a job during the months of Nov-
ember and December of t961. (Ex. 1, R. 13, 354.) 
On Decem·ber 2'8 or December 29, 1961, p1aintiff 
left the home of the parties an·d attended !a cocktail 
party given by her former employer. (R. 390-391, 
354, 559.) She testified that she remained at the 
party from 12:00 Noon until late in the afternoon, 
that thereafter she drove andther man to his apart-
ment, ian·d th·at thereafter she returne'd to her home. 
(R. 390-3'91.) Defendant testified that plaintiff re-
turned home in a drunken condition and that de-
fendant, who had been caring for the children 
throughout the day, thereupon took the children out 
to dinner in order to avoid their exposure to the situ-
ation. (R. 466.) Defendant further testified th~at 
1iliereafter plaintiff locked him ~and the children out 
of the home until approxim·ately 11:00 o'clock P.M. 
when defendant broke into the house in order to 
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gain entrance for his children. (R. 466, 467.) Plain-
tiff denied that she locked them out. (R. 559.) The 
next door neighbor, whom plaintiff had called as a 
witness, testified that she observed defen·dant at-
tempting to gain entrance into the home. (R. 516-
517.) 
On January 15, 1962, defendant discovered the 
diary and plaintiff's s'horthand notes. (R. 320, 494.) 
He thereupon, in order to obtain a speedy trial and 
without prejudice to his rights and without ~admit­
ting that plaintiff was ·a fit person to have custody 
of the children temporarily or otherwise, entered 
into the stipulation dated January 31, 196'2, an·d 
moved out of the home pen·ding trial. (R. 11-12, 198, 
477.) The case was set down for tri~al on M'arch 13, 
1962, (R. 18.) 
During the period 'between the time that de-
fendant moved out of the home and the date of trial, 
plaintiff left the children a great part of the time 
with baby tenders. (R. 185, 472-473, 315'5, 515.) 
Plaintiff asserted at trial that defendant had 
been having an affair with a young woman em-
ployed at Equitable Life Assurance Society. Plain-
tiff testified that in February of 1H61, defendant 
~admitted to plaintiff that he had been out wifu this 
woman. (R. 194-195, 224-225.) Plaintiff made the 
following entry in her diary on March 13, 1961: 
''It is out ; it is over ; it is in the open. 'Karen' is her 
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name. He has never had her out, but is mad about 
her. Sad!!" The only evidence as to any association 
:between defendant and this young woman is the 
following. Defendant, in the company of plaintiff, 
saw the girl at an Equitable Life Assurance p·arty 
at Lagoon. (R. 197.) Defendant also saw the girl 
in the office of Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
Where both he and the girl worked. (R. 197.) The 
girl was a musician. (R. 428.) Defendant was a 
musician by hobby and owned a tape recorder. (R. 
428.) The girl asked the defendant if he would make 
a recording of a musical trio, which included the 
girl, ~a young man, and an older lady, playing their 
musical instruments. (R. 428.) Defendant asked 
his wife if he could invite them to defendant's home 
to make the recording. (R. 428.) Plaintiff replied 
that, if defen·dant did, she would be away. (R. 428.) 
Defendant thereupon went alone to the girl's parent's 
home at which the girl's parents, her grandparents, 
her boy friend, and the older lady were present, 
and made the recording of these people playing their 
musical instruments. Thereafter defendant left the 
people-·and went home. (R. 428.) 
Plaintiff further asserted at trial th1at defen-
dant drank to excess. (R. 190.) Defendant denied 
the aceusation. ( R. 431.) Plaintiff's own witness, 
called for the purpose of corroborating her testi-
mony, testified on cross examination that he had 
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been in the company of defendant at several parties 
given by Equitable Life Assurance Society \Vhere 
liquor was served, that he had never seen defendant 
drink to excess, that defendant had always conducted 
himself as a gentlem·an, th·at defendant was never 
intoxica1ted. (R. 365-3'68.) Earl L. Maw, Certified 
Life Underwriter for Equitable, testified to the 
same effect. (R. 485-4'87.) At this point it should 
be noted that it does not lie in plaintiff's mouth to 
accuse defendant of excessive drinking or to set 
herself up as a judge of such ~a matter. Immediately 
following her affair wi'th Jarvis in his ap·artment 
on Sunday, September 10, 1961, plaintiff wrote in 
shorth·and note (Ex. 21) concerning fue event, "It 
was the first time you have been together without 
drinking. How did you find it? Very dull." (Ex. 21, 
R. 304.) The reco~d is replete with evidence of plain-
tiff's nigh1tly escapades in barrooms on the west 
side of S1alt Lake City, p. 19'9-310. 
At trial plaintiff asserted, as an excuse for 
her misconduct that resulted in this divorce, that it 
made up for some of the hurt that she had suffered 
at fue hands of defendant. (R. 3'28.) When Jarvis 
terminated h'is relationship with plaintiff, she blamed 
Jarvis for a;ll of her difficulties and wrote in Ex-
hibit 23 the following concerning Jarvis, "If I could 
only turn some of the hurt I feel for myself into 
hurting you." (R. 315.) It is apparent that, re-
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gardless of the type of man with whom plaintiff 
associates, she blames her difficulties upon the man. 
It is submitte·d th~a.t plaintiff's accusations 
against defendant were irresponsible and groun'd-
less; and, in any event, she admitted that he was a 
good father, and she did ndt in any respect remotely 
infer th·at defenrdant ever neglected or visited moral 
dep~a.vity upon his children. 
At trial plaintiff on the wi'tness stand repeatedly 
represented 'to the court that she was ashamed, con-
trite and apologetic about her misconduct. (R. 213, 
227, 270.) The evidence in her own handwriting 
completely refutes this. In Febru·ary of 1962, less 
tllan a mon1th before trial, she wrote the folloWing 
note to her husband (Ex. 27.) "You certainly are 
a sneaky bastard. Aren't you? You must feel pretty 
darned good (inside th·at is). I don~t want to make 
this difficult for you to r~ad. How did you enjoy 
the notes out of my little black book - I made it 
easy on some of them, .didn't I? You didn't even 
have to figure them ottt in shorthand. But anyway, I 
wish you could have borrowed them without fold-
ing them down the middle. But I know what a 
Sloppy Pig you are. You will notice that I capitalize 
all the name:s I call you." (R. 828-329.) 
Pl·aintiff offered the testimony of Mrs. Dor-
othea M. McDonald, one of the children's school 
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teachers, to the effect that, when the children came 
to school, they appeared to be well fed and clothed 
and that on the occasions that Mrs. McDonald h·ad 
met plaintiff, plaintiff appeared to be interested in 
her children. (R. 511-512, 345-346.) Mrs. McDonald 
admrtted that she had only seen plaintiff on three 
occasion·s, once at 1a Parent Teachers Association 
meetin·g, once for a few moments at the school, and 
once for a few moments just ·before the trial. (R. 
352.) Mrs. McDonald knew absolutely nothing a·bout 
plaintiff's immoral ·activities and her neglect and 
visitation of depravity upon the ·children. (R. 346-
B52.) 
Plaintiff also offere·d the evidence of Mrs. Bev-
erly Ch·ase, one of plaintiff's neigh'bors, to the effect 
that the children were always clean, well clothed 
and .well fed an·d that the ·home of plaintiff appe'ared 
to be physically clean. (R. 355-356, 518-519.) Mrs. 
C'hase knew absolutely nothing ~about plaintiff's ·ad-
ulterous activities and her attendant visi~ation of 
neglect ·and moral depravi'ty upon the children. 
(R. 356, 357, 519.) The same was true of Mr. 
Lawrence McCormack, Mrs. Glade J. Jensen, and 
Mrs. Clarence L. Hall, called ·as witnesses on ·be·half 
of plaintiff. (R. 384-389, 514-518, 506~511.) 
The uncontroverted facts are that defen1dant 
always took the children to the Presbyterian C1hurch 
an·d ·atten·de·d with them and that plaintiff did not. 
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See: testimony of Rev. Walter J. Kalvesmaki. (R. 
482-484.) Pl1aintiff offered as an excuse th·at prior 
'to the marriage she had been L.D.S., defendant had 
attended the Catholic Church, and that they agreed 
they would not sen:d their children to the L.D.S. 
Church or Catholic c·hurch, and therefore atten'ded 
the Presbyterian Church. (R. 56'4.) Plaintiff's con-
duct, inclinations ~and stan·dards of morality, ex-
emplifie·d throughout the entire record, negate any 
notion that she was remotely exposed to, much less 
influence·d by, the moral precepts and teaching of 
the ChurCh of Jesus ·Christ of Latter-Day S'aints. 
Plaintiff offered no evidence of a constructive 
program for the care 1and protection of the children 
if she were awarded their custody. Between the time 
th·a:t defendant moved out of the home and the ·date 
of trial, plaintiff left the children a great deal of 
the time with baby tenders. ( R. 185, 4 72-4'73, 3'55, 
51'5.) Her evidence was that they would be left with 
baby tenders ·all 'the tin1e she works (R. 185, 
198) and at such times as she engages in other acti-
vities commensurate with her inclinrations. (R. 1'99-
310.) Defendant's evidence was as follows. He is 
prepared to spend a maximum amount of time with 
his children. (R. 203-235, 303, 432, 449, 4'52, 457, 
461-462, 482, 472, 473.) His mother, Mrs. R. A. 
McBroom, Sr., returned home from Florid·a and is 
prepared to expend her entire time caring for the 
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children. (R. 480-481, 500-501.) Defendant had en-
gaged ·a ·competent lady, who is :familiar with child-
ren, to care for the home an'd ·assist his mother in 
caring for the children. (R. 481.) Defendant's sis-
ter-in-law, Mrs. R. A. McBroom, testified 'that her 
own chiluren get along very well with defendant's 
children, 'th1at she loves the children, an'd is pre-
pared ~at any time in the event of an emergency or 
other difficulty to take the children into her home 
and care for them with her own. (R. 502-504.) 
Plaintiff worked, off and on, for ~a total of 48 
months during the ten years of marriage. (Ex. 1, 
R. 184.) The com'bined income of ·~he 'p·arties for 
the ten years was $80,046.27, of which defendant 
earned $6'5,496.08 and plaintiff earned '$14,231.19. 
(Ex. 46, R. 4·79-480.) 
Defendant became ill in the summer of 1957 
and was hospitalized for approximately one month. 
(R. 434-43·5.) Plaintiff claimed that, when ~defen­
dant became ill, she went to work ·and supported the 
family over an extended period of time because as 
a result of the illness defendant did not make suffi-
cient money to support the family in 1957. (R. 361-
36·3.) In fact, defendant went to work upon release 
from the hospital in the summer of 1957 and was 
only off work six weeks. (R. 4315.) Defendant's 
~average net in·come for the ten years of marriage 
was $6,546.90 per year. (Ex. 46, R. 479-480.) De-
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fendant's net income from his earnings during the 
year, 19'57, was $6,454.13. (Ex. 46, R. 479-480.) 
Plaintiff's contention was without merit. 
During the marrilage the parties acquired the 
following property: a home located at 583 Cortez 
Street, Salt L1ake City, U'tah, purchased on October 
15, 19'54, of the approximate value of $16,000.00, 
subject 'to ·a mortgage in the approximate amount 
of $11,300.00; household furniture and fixtures 
located in the home; a stereo set; a 1959 Chevrolet 
automobile, customarily driven by defendant; 1a 19'56 
C'adill·ac automobile purchased for plaintiff in Nov-
ember of 1961; and, life insurance on the life of 
defendant in the face amount of approximlaJtely 
$35,000.00, of whi'ch $12,000.00 was term insurance. 
( R. 176-'180.) 
During ·the m~arriage the parties incurred the 
following obligations testified to 1at trial: mortgag€ 
on the home, in favor of Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, in the amounrt of $11,300.00, upon which 
the monthly payments were $90.00 per month; mort-
gage on the household furniture, in the amount of 
$1700.00, p~ayable in monthly installments of $31.00 
per month; mortgage on the stereo set in the amount 
of $114.00, p'ayable in m'Onthly installments of $19.00 
per month; mottgage on the 1959 Chevrolet in the 
amounrt of $6'50.00, p~aya~ble at $78.00 per month; 
and, mortgage on the 1956 Ca·dillac automobile in 
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the amount of $1,350.00, payable in monthly install-
ments of $78.00 per month; and, certain current ob-
ligati1ons a.s to which plaintiff offered no evidence. 
(R. 177-180.) Affivadits filed by defen·dan't in sup-
port of defendant's motion for new trial and alterna-
tive motions to amend the findings of fact and de-
cree showed the amount of these current obligations 
to be $1,088.02. (R. 53.) The total insurance pre-
miums, payable by defendant under his insurance 
policies, were $27.18 per month for life insurance 
covering the mortgage on the home (R. 59) an·d 
$18.00 per month for dther life insuran1ce premiums. 
(R. 52.) 
Plaintiff was working at time of trial and 
earning $370.00 per month. Defendant was earning 
$'546.00 per month. (R. 39.) 
The trilal court awarded the defendant the di-
vorce an·d plaintiff $1.00 per year alimony. ('R. 42-
4'4.) He then proceeded to find plaintiff to be ·a fit 
and proper person to have the care ·and custody of 
the minor children (R. 38-39), awarded plaintiff 
cus'tody of 'the children, awarded plaintiff all of the 
property of the p·arties, with the exception of the 
19'59 Chevrolet automobile and the stereo set, award-
ed plaintiff $200.00 p·er month for the support of 
the two minor children, ordered defendant to pay 
all of the obligations of the parties wi'th the excep-
tion of the mortgage on the home and the mortgage 
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on the Cadill1ac automobile, ordered defendant to 
keep his life insurance in force for the minor child-
ren, and awarde·d plaintiff a judgment against de-
fendant in the amount of $750.00 to assist her in 
paying her attorneys fees for fraudulently bringing 
this action. ( R. 42-44.) 
The defendant, in ·an affidavit in support of a 
motion for new trial and to amen1d the fin'dings of 
fact and decree, set forth that he was withoutt funds 
to pay the current obligations and plain'tiff's at-
torneys fees, which totaled $1,8'38.02, and that de-
fendant would lbe require·d to fin1ance the payment 
of same through a collateral loan upon which the 
monthly payments would be $115.90 for eighteen 
months. ( R. 5'2-54.) 
Under the decree, therefore, defendant is earn-
ing a net income of $546.00 per month and is re-
quired to pay installment obligations, including 
$'200.00 support money, !totaling $489.08 per month, 
leavin·g ~defendant a n·et income upon which to live 
in the amount of $56;9'2 before payment of rent 
and federal and state in·come taxes. 
Under the decree plaintiff h·as a net income of 
$'370.00 per month from her employment, $200.00 
per month support money, or a tdtal of $570.00 per 
month and is only required to pay $168.00 per month 
in installment obligations, leaving plaintiff with 
$402.00 per month for the support of herself and 
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the two minor children and no obligation to pay 
rent because the court awarded her defendant's 
home. 
By way of explan·ation the following should be 
noted with reference to plaintiff's appeal in this 
ma:tter. The tri1al court entered its findings ·and ·de-
cree on April 23, 1962. ( R. 38-44.) On June 2·5, 
19'62, defendant moved the court for an order, pend-
ing tnis appeal, fixing defendant's rights of visita-
ti~on, restraining plaintiff from punishing the child-
ren for visiting their father, restraining plaintiff 
from attempting to degrade their father in their 
minds ~and from ~attemptin~g to alienate the ch1ildren, 
and restraining plaintiff from removing the children 
from the State of Utah, (R. 9'2-97) because plain-
tiff had repeatedly ·and persisten1tly denield defen-
dant rights of visitation of the children, punished 
the children for visiting with defendant, use·d the 
children and refused defendant his rights of visita-
tion in attempts to extort money from defendant, 
threatened to remove the children from 'the State of 
Utah i'f defendant con'tinued to prosecute this appeal 
and plaintiff had continued Ito visilt neglect and moral 
depravity upon the children. (R. 95-97.) Plaintiff 
filed 'a counterpetition in which plaintiff agreed to 
submit fue m·a tter of visi ta:tion to the court ( R. 98) , 
and sought to hold defendant in contempt on a false 
claim that defendant was behind one month in pay-
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ment of support money. (R. 98-101.) A hearing was 
had on this matter on July 9 and July 11, 1962. 
( R. 582-67 4.) The tri'al court, J u'dge M'arcellus K. 
Snow presjding, found all of the issues in favor of 
defendant (R. 78-81), and on July 19, 1962, en-
tered an order granting defendants rights of visita-
tion and issued restrainin'g orders to guarantee en-
forcement, and thereupon awarded pl'aintiff 'a judg-
ment against defendant in the sum of $12'5.00 for 
attorneys fees in connection with this hearing. (R. 
82-84.) Plaintiff thereupon procee·ded to violate the 
court's order CR. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691) and 
defendant was again required to bring plaintiff into 
court on con1tempt ch~arges (R. 114-115) before 
Judge A. H. Ellett on the 27th day of July, 1962, 
( R. 67'5-6'91) in order to procure enforcement of 
the order. (R. 675-691, 1'27-129.) 
Plaintiff appeals to this court from the order 
of Judge Snow and defendant cross-appeals from 
th,alt p,art of 'the order awarding plaintiff the addi-
tional $12·5.00 attorneys fees. The p'arties stipulated 
in th1is ·court that defendant's appeal from the de-
cree of divorce and plaintiff's appeal from the order 
of Judge Snow entered on July 19, 1962, may be 
consolid1~ted for purpose of hearing in this court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CUS-
TODY OF THE MINOR ·CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES 
TO PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court felt th~at, under the decision in 
Steiger v. Steiger (19"56) 4 U.2d 273, 293 P.2d 
--118, it was justified in awarding custody to the 
plaintiff and n·ot to the defen'dant. In Steiger v. 
Steiger the Supreme Court held that the wife was 
entitled to the custody of the three year old child 
against her husband where \the eviden~e, interpreted 
most strongly against the wife, was that ( 1) on 
two or three occasions she drank alcoholic beverages 
to the point of mild intoxication, (2) was frequent-
ly seen with a man dther than her husband, (3) 
was not a good housekeeper, ·and ( 4) there was no 
evidence of ~adultery on the part of the wife and ( 5) 
there was no evidence that the wife's con~duct ever 
rendered her unable to properly care for the child 
and (6) the evidence showed that the wife's par-
ent's were be1tter able to offer assistance to the 
wife and the child th'an were the husband's parents 
and (7) evidence showe·d that the wife's love for 
the child caused her to spend her free time with 
him, and (8) the evidence showed that the father, 
while he was wfth the child, was abusive to it and 
had little eoncern for the c·hild's welfare. The court 
is so holding said at 293 P.2d p. 420: 
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"Stating the case against (the wife) in 
the strongest possible manner, testimony of 
witnesses indicated that she ( 1) drank in-
'to)Cicating liquors two or three times to the 
point of mild intoxication, (2) was frequently 
seen with a man other than her husband, and 
( 3) was not a good housekeeper. All of this 
testimony however came from defendant's 
witnesses and was rebutted by plaintiff and 
her witnesses. 
* * * * 
''There is no proof in the record that this 
mother drinks excessively so as to render her 
unable to properly care for the child, nor is 
there any evidence of promiscuity. 
"Reading the record as a whole it ap-
pears that (the wife) has been in the past 
careless and indis·creet, but that her love of 
the child has caused her to work to provide 
for him, has caused her to spend her free time 
with him, and care for hi's needs, an·d has 
caused her to fight for his custody. In the 
li'ght of these facts it canndt be s'aid that she 
is an unfit mother. 
"'This court has stated that 'a divorced 
mother has no absolute right to the custody 
of m1inor children under U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-10, 
Sampsell v. Holt, 150 U. 73, 202 P.2d 550, 
but the policy of our decisions has been to give 
weight to the view that all things being equal, 
preference should be given to the mother in 
awarding custody of ·a child of tender years, 
notwithstanding the divorce is granted to the 
f,ather. * * * And this Yiew is 'based upon the 
oft-stated. purpose of the award of custody 
to provi'de for the child's best interest and 
welfare * * *. 
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" * * * The (wife's) parents are bette11 
able to offe,· financial assistance to (the wife) 
and the child than are (the husband's) par-
ents * * *. Additionally, there is no evidence 
that the mother has ever neglected the child, 
although she has had his sole care while the 
father was serving in the army; there is some 
evidence that the father was somewhat abu-
sive to the child when he did have contact 
with him, and has been little concerned with 
the child's welfare." 
The decision in Steiger v. Steiger does not support 
the trial cour't's award of custody of 'the children to 
the plain'tiff. It is authority dire·ctly to the con-
trary. T:he evidence is conclusive that the plaintiff 
repeatedly committed adultery; that she did not 
spend her free time with her children, but spent it 
in dissipation and illicit relationships; that ·she re-
peatedly stayed out all night, drank al'coholic bev-
erages, and did not provide care for the children; 
tllat she SU'bjectively visited insidious rand immoral 
depravity upon the children; that defendant never 
was abusive to the children, was a good :father, and 
provided adequate care and protection for the ·child-
ren, particularly during periods of his wife's de-
pravity 1and neglect; and, that defendant's family 
is prepared to offer every assistance in the care 
of the children, and there is no evidence that pl'ain-
tiff's family has or will offer any assistance in ·the 
care of 'the children. The evidence shows thlat plain-
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tiff has, and intends to, continuously leave the child-
ren with baby tenders. 
In cases where the evidence shows adultery, use 
of intoxicants over an exten·ded period, or other 
dissipation, on the part of a parent and that evi-
dence is coupled with neglect of the children, or 
with visitation of immoralrty upon the children, the 
Supreme Court has uniformly approved depriving 
the parent of custody of the children. See: Walton 
v. Coffman (1946) 110 U. 1, 139 P.2d 97; In Re 
Olson (19'47) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210; In Re 
Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 197 P.2d 978; and 
State of Utah in the Interest of K----- B----- (19158) 
7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 395. 
In Walton v. Coff'YlWn (1946) 110 U. 1, 139 
P.2d 97, the evi1dence showed that the mother asso-
ciated with men other than her husband, used al-
coholic beverages over an extended period, and th~at 
at su'ch times she neglected 'the children, who were 
nine and ten years ·of age. The Supreme Court revers-
ed the trial cour't, deprived the mother of custody of 
the children and awarded custody to the grand-
p'arents on the ground tllat it was in the best in-
terest of the children. The Supreme Court held that 
~abstinence by the mother from such misconduct 
from the time of commencement of the action down 
to the date of trial was not of sufficient probative 
v~alue to overcome the ·admitted evidence of her 
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misconduct up until the time of commencement of 
the litigation because of the inherent inclination 
on the part of the mother to refrain from such 
conduct while the litigation was pending. The evi-
dence in this case shows such misconduct on the 
part of Mrs. McBroom both before and after com-
mencement of the action. 
In re Olson (1947) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210, 
the evidence showed that the father used alcoholic 
beverages over an extended period and, during this 
period, left the child, age eight, with an aunt and 
grandparents and did not provide personal care for 
the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court the father 
claimed that because the child was receiving ade-
quate care from other relatives, it was not a neglect-
ed child and, therefore, the trial court erred in de-
priving him of custody and granting custody to 
the aunt and grandparents. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court and held that evidence that 
other relatives provide care for a child personally 
neglected by a parent, does not negative the fact 
that the parent has neglected his parental respon-
sibility and th·at the child is a neglected child. In the 
case before this court the admitted facts are that 
Mrs. McBroom continuously spent her time in bar-
rooms and carried on her immoral and dissipated 
relationships all hours of the day and night and 
that, while she was so doing, she left the children 
with either young baby sitters or the defendant, and 
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she testified that she was not concerned about the 
cllildrens' care because her 'husband wars 'a good 
father. She persistently refused and by lying and 
artifi~e avoided caring for, and engaging 'in acti-
vities concerne'd wi'th, the welfare of the children. 
In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 197 P.2d 
9'78, the evidence showed that the mother engaged 
in relations out of wedlock and over a three month 
period left the child in question in the care of an 
aunt and uncle ~and during this period neglected the 
child. ·The Supreme Court held that, where the evi-
dence showed immorality on the p·art of the mother 
and neglect of the child over a three month period, 
the child was a neglected child and affirmed the 
trial court in depriving the mother of custody of 
the infant and awarding custody to the 'aun't and 
uncle. 
In State of Utah in the Interest of K----- B-----
(19'58) 7 U.2d 398, 3'26 P.2d 395, the Supreme 
Court in depriving the father of custody of his 
child said in its opinion that the obscenity visited 
upon the child should be spared the light of print 
and therefore did not set it out in its opinion. In 
the case before this court the moral depravity visited 
by plaintiff upon the children is of such a n~ature 
that it likewise should be spared the light of print. 
If it were assumed for purposes of argument 
only that plaintiff is a fit person to have the custody 
of the children, the trial court nevertheless erred in 
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awarding custody to pl'aintiff because it is in the 
best interest of the children that custody be ·award-
ed to defendanlt. 
Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides: "When a 
decree of divorce is made the court m·ay make such 
orders 'in relation to the children * * * as may be 
equitable * * * ." Sec. 30-3-10, U.C.A., 1'953, pro-
vides: "In any case of separation of husband and 
lvife having minor child~en, the mother shall be en-
titled to the care, custody and ·control of ·all such 
children * * * (under the age of ten years) * * * ; 
provided * * * that if it shall be made to appear 
to a court * * * that the m·other is an immoral, in-
competent or otherwise 'improper person, then the 
court may award the custody of the children to 
the father * * * ." 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
the provision of Sec. 30-3-10, requiring a finding 
th,at the mdther is an 'immoral, in·competent or other-
wi'se improper person as a ·condition to the award-
ing custody of children under the age of ten years 
to the father, applies only to cases of separation 
and not to cases of divorce. The court h'as held that 
Sec. 30-3-5, in providing that, when a de·cree of 
divorce is made, the court may make such orders in 
relation to the children as may be equitable, author-
izes the ·court in cases ·df divorce to award custody o'f 
the 'children to the father when i't is in the best inter-
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est of the ·children without a finding that the mother 
is unfit. See: Johnson v. Johnson (1958) 7 U.2d 263, 
32-3 P.2d 16, in which the court awarded custody of 
·an eight year old child to the father where the evi-
den~e slhowed that the mother w~as living ·alone and 
working because it was in the best interest of the 
child; Jaques v. Jaques ( 1921) 58 U. 265, 198 P. 770, 
in whi'ch the court awarded custody of the two child-
ren ages seven and ten, to the paternal gr~andmother 
even though the court found the mother to be a fit 
and proper person because it was in the children's 
best interest; and, Sampsell v. Holt (1949) 115 U. 
73, 202 P.2d 550. 
In Stuber v. Stuber (1952) 121 U. 632, 244 
P.2d 650, the wife brought an action to regain cus-
tody of the child from the husband. The court award-
ed custody of the child to the wife because the evi-
dence showed that, while the child was living with 
the husband, the husband, his mother and his second 
wife were working and the child was required to 
spend extended periods of time with baby tenders 
while they were working; and, the evidence on be-
half of the wife showed that she was living with 
her grandmother, the maternal grandmother was 
not working and the maternal grandmother and the 
wife were prepared to offer the personal care of a 
blood relative for the child at all times. In the case 
before this court the evidence shows that defendant 
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is prepared to offer the care :of himself and ·blood 
relatives for the children at all times and that plain.;. 
tiff persistently and continuously leaves the child~ 
ren with baby tenders over extended periods. 
In the final analysis the ultimate question· be-
fore this court is, what is in the best interest of the 
children? To be raised in a background of insecurity, 
1noral irresponsibility, neglect, depravity and baby 
tenders; or, to be raised in a background of security, 
moral responsibilty, integrity, ·adequate care and 
protection, by their own relatives. 
POINT 2. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF $200.00 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT 
OF THE TWO MINOR CHILDREN AND ALL OF THE 
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES. 
If it were assumed for purposes of argument 
only that plaintiff is a fit person to have the custody 
of the children, which we do not admit, then in such 
event the trial court abused its discretion in award-
ing plaintiff $200.00 per month for the support 
of the two children and all of the property of the 
defendant with the exception of his 1959 Chevrolet 
automobile and a stereo set. 
At the outset it must be remembered that 
plaintiff, while she was carrying on an adulterous 
and immoral relationship, consorting in barrooms, 
staying out all hours of the night with ·a married 
man, and forsaking her children and her home, de-
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li'berately conceived and set out in her own hand-
writing a scheme and plan to commence thlis divorce 
action and take from defendant his children, his 
home and his money and, right at the time of com-
mencement of the action, plaintiff admitte·d in her 
own handwriting that she did so, not because of mis-
conduct on the part of defendant, but because of her 
relationship with Jarvis. 
Th·e finan·cial situation of the parties was not 
good ·at 'the time of trial. It is small wonder when 
viewed in the light of plaintiff's conduct. 
Under the decree, the defendant is earning a 
net in·come of $546.00 per month and is required to 
pay monthly installment obligations, including 
$200.00 support money, totalling $489.08 per month, 
leaving defendant ·a net income upon which to live 
in the amount of $56.92 before payment of rent 
and federal and state income taxes. Under the de-
cree plaintiff has a net income of $370.00 per month 
from ~her employment, $200.00 per month support 
money, a total of $570.00 per month, and is only 
required to p·ay the installment payments on the 
home and her Cadillac automobile in the amount of 
$168.00 per month, leaving plaintiff with $402.00 
per month for the support of herself and the two 
minor children and no obligation to pay rent. 
In cases where the wife has not been guilty of 
misconduct and has been awarded the divorce be-
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cause of the husband's misconduct, it has been stan-
dard practice not to ,award the wife more than 
$50.00 per month per child where the financial cir-
cumstances are simillar to those of the parties. 
We earnestly submit that, if plaintiff were a 
fit person to have the custody of the children, un'der 
no circumstances should she be awarded more th~an 
$50.00 per month per child for support. 
The home and the household furnishings and 
fixtures, together with the life insurance on the life 
of defendant, represent substantially all of the 
worldly accumulations of the parties. If the defen-
dant is awarded custody of the minor children, in 
view of plaintiff's misconduct, defendant should be 
awarded the home and the household furnishings 
and fixtures. If it were assumed for purposes of 
argument only that plaintiff is a fit person to have 
the custody of the children, then in such event plain-
tiff should not be awarded more than a one-half 
interest in the home, ,and the home should be ordered 
sold under the supervision of the court at such time 
as both children have attained the age of majority 
and the proceeds should be divided equally between 
the parties. Plaintiff in the interim should be re-
quired to make the monthly payments on the home 
and not be entitled to credit therefor because she 
is living in the home of the defendant fraudulently. 
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POINT 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF $1.00 PER YEAR ALIMONY AND $7'50.00 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The effect of the trial court's decree is to actu-
ally reward a parent for adultery, dissipation, im-
morality, negle~t of the parent's children and an 
utter lack of any regard for the S'anctity of mar-
riage. But, in the face of the admitted facts that 
plaintiff falsely and fraudulently instituted and 
maintained this divorce action for the purpose of 
carrying on an immoral relationship with a mar-
ried man, to award plaintiff $750.00 attorneys fees 
to assist her in so doing is absolutely unconscion-
able. 
The same is true of the $1.00 per year alimony. 
It is no answer to say that the award of $1.00 per 
year alimony to plaintiff is of no consequen·ce. It 
is apparent from her record of immorality an·d dis-
honesty that she will hold this over defendant's 
head for the rest of his life. 
Furthermore the record in the case before the 
court shows the following. The sworn complaint, 
upon which the restraining order issued causing 
defendant to be thrown out of his home, expressly 
set forth that defendant had beaten his wife on 
m·any occasions. It was subscribed and sworn to by 
plaintiff before her attor11ey, Mr. McCullough, act-
ing as a notary public. The verification expressly 
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set forth that the plaintiff appeared before McCul-
lough and swore under oath that she had read the 
complaint, knew its contents and the same was 
true. Plaintiff admitted at trial tha:t defendant had 
never be·aten her and explained that she had signed 
the complaint without reading it. It was incumbent 
upon plaintiff to read the complaint and see that 
its contents were correct. As a result plaintiff has 
caused defendant to be maliciously libeled .and a 
public record to be mlade to the effect that Mr. Mc-
Broom is a wife beater. 
In si'tua:tions where the misconduct of the wife 
was far less reprehensilble th·an 'that in the case 
before this court, the Su·preme Cou1t has denied 
the wife any alimony ·and has refused to allow her 
any attorneys fees. See, Holm v. Holm (1914) 44 U. 
242, 139 P. 937; and, Gr~aziano v. Graziano (1958) 
7 U.2d 187, 321 P.2d 931. 
The italics ~are 'by the writer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HYDE 
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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